This paper proposes a theoretical model and shows that the comparative advantage of China's factor endowment allows firms specializing in the midstream stage to gain at least as much as firms that specialize in the two ends of the supply chain (capital-intensive stage and labourintensive stage) in terms of labour productivity and profitability, if and only if they have at least as much viability and use intermediate level of capital intensity. The empirical results are consistent with the theory's predictions. Our findings on China's industry supply chain production patterns provide a new angle on the division of gains in the vertical production network driven by the endowment structure. This could have far-reaching implications for the industrial development of other middle-income countries.
Introduction
This paper studies the role of factor endowment structure in shaping the division of the gains in China's industry supply chains.
3 While whether industrial policies in developing countries that encourage industrialization and industrial upgrading should conform to countries' comparative advantage is still under debate (Lin and Chang,2009) , this paper provides a theoretical framework for deriving the conditions under which Chinese firms that conform to the comparative advantage in the intermediate capital-intensive stage could benefit at least as much as the vertically linked firms that defy the comparative advantage in the capital-intensive stage and labour-intensive stage in China's industry supply chain.
In this paper, we develop a hierarchy assignment model where the production process is split into three stages, with exclusive dealership among vertically-linked firms. In order to study profit sharing along the vertical production structure, we must remove the incentives for firms to vertically integrate with each other. We adopt the quantity fixing vertical restraint contracting choices, which is in line with the approach by Gans (2005,2014) , Shen and Scaramozzino (2017) , Shen, Liu and Chow (2016) and Shen, Zhang and Fang (2017) . As a result, each vertically linked firm cannot reduce its output for marginalizing and the firms in the chains have no incentive to vertically integrate with each other. Production technology in each stage is Cobb-Douglas with labour and capital as inputs. Labour demand depends on firm's labour productivity and firm's viability in each stage. Wage is assumed to be higher in more upstream stages. In a supply chain with exclusive dealing and quantity fixing contract, profit maximization leads to an inverted U-shape in profitability and labour productivity from an increase in capital intensity. Our model shows that firms that specialize at midstream stage with intermediate level of capital-intensiveness gain the most, have the highest viability and labour-productivity compared to firms at capital-intensive upstream and labour-intensive downstream stages in the chain. The intuition behind this model is that given China is a middleincome country with its comparative advantage of endowment structure in the intermediate level of capital-intensiveness (neither labour-intensive nor capital-intensive), firms that are most profitable in the Chinese industry chains are those who operate within the production stages that are consistent with the current comparative advantage of endowment structure of Chinese economy.
We also explore how our theory can shed some new perspectives on the production patterns, with regard to whether China tends to specialize in relatively upstream, midstream, or downstream industries, profits and labour productivity (Q/L), given China's industry capital intensities (K/L) in those industries. To achieve these objectives, we construct a measure of upstreamness following the same strategy proposed by Antràs, Chor, Fally and Hillberry (2012) . Consistent with findings in Fally (2011) , we find an industry's upstreamness is positively correlated with capital intensity in China. In addition, consistent with our model's predictions, we find that labour productivity and profit share peak when capital intensity is at the intermediate level and these industries are midstream industries in China. In other words, the relationship between profit share and capital intensity and labour productivity and capital intensity is inverted U-shaped. These findings are robust to the inclusion of additional set of controls.
The main contribution of this paper is that it not only recognizes the role of the level of viability of firms in sustaining their competitiveness in the industry supply chain, but also puts the factor endowment structure into the centre of the analytical framework. We show that firms with intermediate level of capital-intensiveness in China that conform to the comparative advantage by the economy's factor endowment is the main cause of their greater prosperity than Chinese firms specializing in the labour-intensive downstream and capital-intensive upstream stages in the supply chain that deviate from the current comparative advantage of China's factor endowment. 4 This closely captures the recent framework of new structural economics (NSE) developed by Lin (2012 Lin ( , 2015 and Ju, Wang and Lin (2015) who states a developing country ought to adopt a strategy of CAF in its industrial development, in order to catch up with more advanced economies.
The uneven distribution of gains along the supply chains has been analyzed by several papers in the literature (Gereffi,1994; Krugman, 1994; Costinot, Vogel and Wang, 2013; Dingra and Bernard, 2014; Liu, Shen and Chow, 2016; Baldwin et al, 2014; Basco and Mestieri, 2014) ; but most of these papers do not discuss the conditions under which such an uneven division of the gains in the supply chain will emerge. While most of the related works have focused on the profit sharing pattern among firms at the global level, and little work has been done on the 4 According to the annual data published by the world bank in 2017, the annual GDP per capita (in dollars) of China is $8827, which makes China one of middle-income countries in the world. According to Lin (2012) division of gains along the industry supply chain within a country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the empirical motivation for our model. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 sets up the model and generates the model's predictions. Section 5 provides the empirical support for the model. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Motivation

Smile curve
The empirical motivation of this paper stems from the smile curve, which is widely discussed in the international business literature. The initial proponent of the smile curve, Stan Shih, the founder of ACER, pointed out that assembly firms in the global laptop supply chains earn much less than R&D and advertising firms. The idea of the smile curve is that the distribution of value-added of firms producing along the supply chains can be illustrated as a U-shaped curve in which the two ends of the supply chains, namely R&D and marketing, gain most, whereas the production stages in the middle, such as assembly or manufacturing, benefit less (Mudambi, 2007 (Mudambi, , 2008 Stan Shih, 1996; Ming, Meng &Wei, 2015) . The following graph shows how the smile curve works.
Figure 1. Firm-level Smile Curve
Source: Smiling Curve of value creation (Mudambi, 2007) Instead of using the term location in Figure 1 , we use the term upstreamness (or the average distance from final use) from Antras, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) to measure the relative production position in each industry. If we simplify the production process into three stages, 5 in figure 1, R&D belongs to the upstream industry, marketing belongs to the downstream industry, and manufacturing belongs to the midstream industry. In addition, Fally (2011) show that a more upstream industry is more capital intensive, and we also find support for this positive correlation in our empirical results using Chinese data. In other words, in Figure 1 , R&D is more upstream and capital intensive, marketing is more downstream and labour intensive, and manufacturing is midstream and has an intermediate level of capital intensity.
It is important to point out that while the smile curve may hold for value added, it may not be the case for profits. In other words, firms in midstream industries do not necessarily have lower profits than in other industries. Take the example of the Taiwan's laptop industry: after Acer started to specialize in upstream R&D and downstream marketing and advertising stages, Acer was no longer as profitable as it had been when it specialized in the manufacturing stage of chips and screen production (Tsai and Hung, 2006) .
One possible explanation for the failure of Acer's shift to the R&D and marketing stages is that Acer deviated from the comparative advantage of Taiwan's factor endowment. By the late 1990s, Taiwan was no longer a labour-abundant economy nor was it as capital abundant as the US or other Western European countries.
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Instead, one could argue that Taiwan's comparative advantage lies in the intermediate capital-intensive industries. As a result, it is possible that the failure of Acer's shift to the R&D and marketing and post-sale services stages largely results from specializing in stages in the supply chain that were not consistent with the comparative advantage of the endowment structure of Taiwan's economy at the time.
In contrast, the success of another Taiwan laptop firm, Quanta Computers, in the late 1990s, illustrates the importance of operating within industries that are consistent with the comparative advantage of the factor endowment structure of Taiwan's economy, which is 5 We make this simplification here because our model also simplifies the production process into three stages to deliver tractable solutions. Our empirical results in section 5, however, are not constrained to only three production stages. 6 Taiwan was a middle-income country/region by late 1990s. For countries with low level of GDP per capita, their comparative advantage is labour and should specialize in the labour intensive stages in the supply chain, and for countries with high level GDP per capita, their comparative advantage is capital and should specialize in the capital-intensive stages in the supply chain. within the production stages in the chains that are consistent with the comparative advantage of the endowment structure of the economy, the cost they incur is minimal whereas if firms from developing countries follow the industrialization strategy of defying comparative advantag, they incur higher costs and lose their competitiveness in the industry supply chain. The prevalence of the smile curve in the international business literature is prone to lead to the misunderstanding that if firms from developing countries stick to the non-excessively capital-intensive production stage such as heavy industries, R&D and so on, they always lose out, compared with firms from developed countries that specialize in either of the two ends of the curve. According to Lin and Sun (2009) , the viability of firms and their capital accumulation are contingent upon the dynamic change in the comparative advantage of a country. It is true to say that at the global supply chain level, firms from developed countries specializing in excessively capital-intensive stages earn more than firms from low-income countries specializing in the more labour-intensive stage, but opportunities are also provided for developing countries in the future to accumulate the required capital for the industrial upgrading of the endowment structure.
From figure 2, it can be seen that Manufacturing and Assembly parts of the industry chains have the highest profit-margins compared to the rest, which contradicts the smile curve. The following graph shows how such inverted U-shaped curve works for Japanese manufacturing industry chains: Figure 3 . Inverted U-shaped curve for Japanese manufacturing industries Source: Wang and Chen (2014) In order to resolve this paradox, Baldwin.et.al (2014) Figure 4. Economy-wide division of the gains in Asian regions Source: Baldwin.et.al(2014) Despite the fact that Baldwin.et.al (2014) make the distinction between firm level and sectorial level of smile curve, they do not further investigate why such inverted U-shaped curve at the sectorial level would emerge for regional industry chains. This paper fills this gap and shows the variation in profitability and labour productivity of different sectors along the industry chains is determined by whether these sectors are consistent with the comparative advantage of factor endowment structure of the economy.
We first estimate the profitability along the global iPhone industry chain to illustrate the idea that even in the global supply chains, comparative advantage of factor endowment across nations with different income levels determines the relative competitiveness of each vertically-linked firms. We apply the commonly used inverse value of the average 'Price-Earnings Ratio'
(or 'P/E ratio' for short) from 2014 to 2016 as a proxy for firms' profitability. In corporate finance, the inverse value of the P/E ratio is equivalent to the earning yield for the companies in the stock market. The higher the average inverse value, the lower the P/E ratio. The profitability along the global iPhone industry chain is U-shaped: 
Some Stylized facts of Chinese industry chains
We estimate the profitability of firms along the five most representative industry supply chains in China from 2014 to 216 and find the profit sharing patterns to be inverted U-shaped as opposed to smile-curve shaped. Having established an inverted U-shaped pattern between profitability and production stages using case studies, we review the literature in section 3, build a model in section 4 to explain the patterns observed above and provide empirical support to the model using more rigorous empirical analysis in section 5.
3.Literature Review
This paper stands at the intersection of three streams of literature. The first is the trade literature focusing on the way in which sequential production affects the division of the gains between the inter-connected nations at the global level (Melitz and Redding, 2015; Clare 2010;  Arokolakis, Costinot and Clare 2012; Scaramozzino 2017, Shen, Deng and Fang 2016 ; Ju and Yu, 2015) . The second stream is the global supply chain approach, from the perspective of the management and international business literature (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Kaplinsky 2000) . And lastly the New Structural Economics (NSE) literature focusing on the crucial nature of the comparative advantage of the factor endowment structure for the viability of firms in a competitive and open economy (Lin 2003 (Lin , 2012 Lin and Tan 1999; Ju, Wang and Lin 2015, etc.) This paper contributes to the sequential production literature in international trade theory. Most of the articles in the relevant field focus on the division of the gains from international trade, but have not paid enough attention to the division of the gains from vertical production structures in global trade. Although some papers, such as those by Shen and Scaramozzino (2017) and Shen, Zhang and Fang (2018) , also discuss how the profits are shared among the various vertically linked firms in the supply chains, our paper differs fundamentally from them in two aspects: (1) Our main focus is on the domestic vertical production structure whereas those works consider profit sharing along the global supply chains; and (2) our paper puts the role of factor endowment structure at the centre of the analysis, whereas the above two works treat the entry cost and endogenous sunk cost as the key factors in shaping the division of the gains in supply chains. While Shen, Fang and Deng (2016) recognize the importance of the role of labour productivity in determining the division of the gains in supply chains, our paper goes one step further by asking what actually determines the higher labour productivity of some firms in the chains. The answer to this question lies in the comparative advantage of the factor endowment structure of the stages in the chains where the firms are located. Our result that firms specializing in intermediate capital-intensity stages are more profitable differs from Ju and Yu (2015) , in which they find that more upstream firms are more profitable. One possible explanation for this difference may be that upstreamness measures in Ju and Yu(2015) are constructed based on manufacturing industries and the firms in their samples are only manufacturing firms. Our upstreamness measures, however, are constructed based on all
Chinese industries in the input-output table.
Second, this paper is also closely linked to the management and international business literature on the global supply chains pioneered by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) and Kaplinsky (2000) . They propose that the entry barriers of each production stage in the value chains largely affect the division of the gains between firms. Nonetheless, our paper further argues that such entry barriers ought to be endogenous to whether the stages where the firms operate are consistent with the comparative advantage of the factor endowment structure of the economy. In other words, if firms enter the industries that are in line with the comparative advantage of the local factor endowment structure, then they find fewer entry barriers and lower entry cost and, conversely, if firms enter the industries that defy comparative advantage, they find the opposite.
Lastly, we integrate the literature on the comparative advantage in a country's endowment structure with the sequential production literature in international trade theory. Lin and Tan (1999) and Lin (2003) propose that the viability of firms plays a key role in shaping the division of the gains in Chinese industry chains. Similarly, the paper by Ju, Wang and Lin (2015) propose to treat the dynamic upgrading of the factor endowment structure as the key reason for firms to accumulate capital as far as possible. According to their work, there exists the inverted U-shaped growth pattern of each industry. What sets this paper apart from previous work is that we incorporate the framework of sequential production into the analysis.
Model
Supply chains
Our model is inspired by the 'hierarchy assignment models' developed by several studies (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1982; Kremer, 1993; Hansberg, 2004, 2006 
Technology
The labour demand at the ith stage is defined as * ( * ) = ( * ) 0 1 * , where 0 < * < 1 and represents the level of viability of a firm at the ith stage in the chain.
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* is the amount of labour required to produce output * 0 1 in the ith stage; the higher the * , more labour is required to produce the same amount of output. The rationale behind such a functional form of the labour demand function is that, in accordance with Lin (2003) , if a firm in the chain has a high level of viability (that is, a higher value of f), then it is more consistent with the comparative advantage of endowment structure of the economy, which allows it to be more capable of absorbing a higher level of labour employment in the production stage.
Meanwhile, * * ( * ) measures the labour cost for firms at the ith stage. The labour market at each particular stage is assumed to be perfectly competitive implying that all firms in a particular production stage face the same level of wages. In this paper, we assume that the technology available for all firms is a Cobb-Douglas production function Q= * ( * ) A 1 * ( * ) C 1 , for i = 1, 2 and 3, and constant returns to scale such that * + * = 1. Furthermore, for the sake of obtaining the interior solution, we assume that * ≥ 1 where i=1,2 and 3.
Contracting Choices
In line with the works of Bernard and Dhingra (2015) and Hart and Tirole (1990) , in order to resolve downstream firms' moral hazard and free-riding problems arising from the competitive nature of production stages, which causes the lower joint-profitability in the vertical production structure, we adopt the exclusive dealing contracts in the chain to maximize the joint profits. contracting is that it can eradicate the so-called "business stealing effect" in which the profitsharing of each firm along the supply chains is heavily affected by the competitive nature of 11 In a typical supply chain, most of the firms specializing in the upstream stage are undertaking R&D activities and thus generating a higher wage level than is seen in the firms in the middle, which specialize in high-value added or advertising work. The same logic holds true between the firms in the middle of the chain and the marketing firms in the downstream stages of the chain.. The stylized facts regarding more R&D-intensive firms paying higher wages are also supported by some of the very recent empirical literature, such as Aghion, Bergeaud, Blundell and Griffith (2017) . 12 Marvel (1982) defines exclusive dealing as a contractual requirement by which retailers or distributors promise a supplier that they will not handle the goods of competing producers. According to Meza and Selvaggi (2007) , any clause that explicitly prohibits one of the contracting parties from dealing with non-contracting counterparts can be deemed as intrinsically exclusive.
the market structure of each production stage.
1314
In the model, it is assumed that the upstream firm specifies the equilibrium level of output in the exclusive dealing contract in which the midstream and downstream firms are obliged to produce and the upstream firm does not receive a fixed payment for this contract. The reason for making this simplification is to avoid the double marginalization problem within the vertical production structure. (Rey and Stiglitz, 1994) . To eliminate the inefficiencies arising from the double marginalization, we adopt the quantity fixing vertical restraint contracting choices, which is in line with the approach by Gans (2005,2014) , Shen and Scaramozzino (2017) , Shen, Liu and Chow (2016) and Shen, Zhang and Fang (2017) .
Many of the recent scholars on international trade have analysed the determinants of outsourcing and vertical integration strategies when the production stages are globally dispersed (Antràs and Helpman, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Costinot et al., 2013; Alfaro et al., 2018) . However, unlike these scholars, we must remove the incentives for firms to vertically integrate with each other in order to study the firm-level profit sharing along the vertical production structure. In this paper, if we adopt the quantity fixing imposed by one firm in the chain, each vertically linked firm cannot reduce its output for marginalizing and therefore the firms in the chains have no incentive to vertically integrate with each other.
This then leads to the second assumption in this paper:
Assumption 2: The ex-post output in all stages is equal: < = > = ? = * .
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More importantly, the idea of this exclusive dealership is that it is the first-best output which can maximize the joint profits of all the firms producing along the supply chains. In other words, * specified in the contract is the unique solution which solves the following problem: * = NOPOQ The 'business steal effect' was a name first coined by Dingra and Bernard (2015) in their NBER working paper, in which they proposed the idea that some firms in the global trade benefit less because they operate within a more competitive market, where there are other similar firms that steal some of their market share.
14 The removal of "business stealing effect" could largely explain the difference between the conclusions derived from our model and the ones from Ju and Yu(2015) . Ju and Yu (2015) argue that the profitability and capital-intensity are higher for Chinese upstream industries compared with downstream industries. Such higher profitability of upstream industries, from our point of view, could be the result of high monopolistic market power enjoyed by the firms in these upstream industries.
Solution
The profit function for a representative firm at the ith stage is found in:
Similarly, the profit function for the firm at the i+1th stage can be written as follows:
*\< ( *\< ) = p *\< *\< − *\< ( *\< ) − * *\< ( *\< )
The optimization problem at the ith stage can be expressed as:
Take the derivative of (3) with respect to q, to obtain 
Plug (6) into (5), profit-maximizing price at the ith stage is the following:
different between different stages since each stage is assigned to different countries throughout the world. Nonetheless, for any domestic economy, it is reasonable to assume that there exists a unified banking system which sets a uniform interest rate in the domestic market. The Chinese case is no exception. Hence, in this paper, we assume that all firms in the domestic supply chains face a uniform interest rate, regardless of the positions they occupy in the chains. 
Plug (7) into (8): 
Equation (9) can be written as:
The mathematical expression for average profitability at the ith stage becomes: 
From (11), it can be seen that the average profitability function consists of two effects: The first is the capability effect, which captures the level of the average labour product of the firm. The second is the average variable cost effect. Both of these two effects are largely contingent upon the viability level of the firm.
With the fixing quantity * , the ex-post profit at the ith stage is therefore: 
Using (12) and (13), proposition 1 can be derived:
The profitability curve becomes flat when 
.
> ≥ ?
Please see Appendix B for the proof of proposition 2.
Based on propositions 1 and 2, we find the conditions for the flat and the inverted U-shaped profitability curves to hold. The mid-upstream firm not only has to have a higher (equal) viability level than the upstream and downstream firms, but also has to be in more capitalintensive than the downstream firms and less capital-intensive than upstream firm to sustain its higher labour productivity. That is to say, the capital-intensiveness of mid-upstream has to be intermediate.
If firms from middle-level income developing economies participate in the midstream
manufacturing stage of the chain, its factor endowment structure must be at the intermediate level of capital-intensity, such that these firms could be as profitable as or more profitable than the capital-intensive upstream and labour-intensive downstream firms. This argument is consistent with Lin's (2012) argument that a developing economy ought to use its comparative advantage in the factor endowment structure in terms of promoting its comparative-advantage to follow industries that can make most profits and become most viable. According to our theory, firms in a middle-income country participating in the intermediate level of capitalintensive industries along the industry supply chain could gain as much profitability as the firms specializing in the two ends of the chains, if not more.
Empirical Evidence
We explore how our theory can shed some new perspectives on production patterns, with regard to whether China tends to specialize in relatively upstream or downstream industries, profits and output per labour (Q/L) in those industries, given China's industry capital intensities (K/L). To achieve these objectives, we construct a measure of upstreamness following the same strategy proposed by Antràs, Chor, Fally and Hillberry (2012) (hereafter referred to as ACFH 2012) . In an open economy, the position of an industry's output in the value chain is given by the following:
where for each industry ∈ {1,2 … , }, the value of gross output * equals the sum of its final good use ( * ) and intermediate input use ( * ) plus exports ( * ) minus imports ( * ). In the summation, Š *‹ is the domestic absorption of sector 's output to produce one dollar's worth of industry 's output. In particular, Š *‹ is constructed as follows:
where *‹ is the dollar amount of sector 's output needed to produce one dollar's worth of industry 's output. 17 As shown in ACFH 2012, iterating this, we can express industry 's output as an infinite sequence of terms which reflect the use of this industry's output at different positions in the value chain. The upstreamness of industry is as follows:
(15)
Empirical Specification
Proposition 2 in the theory section leads us to estimate the following specifications: *t = < *t + t + *t , *t = < *t + > *t > + t + *t , / *t = < *t + > *t > + t + *t ,
where *t is the capital-labour ratio (or capital intensity, hereafter used interchangeably) for industry at time . *t is upstreamness, *t is profit share, defined as profits divided by total value added, and / *t is output per labour (or labour productivity, hereafter used interchangeably), defined as total value added divided by total wages for labour for industry at time . t is the time fixed effects. Our model predicts that when capital intensity is at the intermediate level, production that takes place is more midstream, there is more output per labour generated, and profit share is higher. In other words, Š < > 0, ¤ < and Š < > 0, and ¤ > and Š > < 0.
Alongside capital-labour intensities, trade protection measures such as tariffs and nontariff barriers, U.S. industry characteristics such as assets, advertising and R&D expenditures, and costs of capital and wages may explain differences in the dependent variable. We consider these factors using an augmented specification as follows: *t = < *t + + *t + t + *t , *t = < *t + > *t > + *t + t + *t , / *t = < *t + > *t > + *t + t + *t ,
where *t is a vector of additional time-varying industry characteristics, and t controls for time fixed effects which absorb the changes in costs of capital and wages. 
Data
The previous section made it evident that our main objective is to investigate the relationship between China's production patterns and capital-labor ratio. To achieve this objective, we employ data from China's Input-Output Table in We construct the capital-labor ratio from the IO tables based on value-added capital depreciation and labour wages for each industry. Profit share is constructed using profit in the industry divided by the total value added in the industry. We employ additional controls that vary over industry and time, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, U.S. industry characteristics such as assets, advertising and R&D expenditures, obtained from Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017).
21 Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. At the upper section of this table, we report the mean, standard deviation, min and max for the dependent variables. The mean across 111 industries and 3 years is 3.10 with standard deviation 1.10. The average industry therefore enters into production processes two 18 We do not include industry fixed effect because there is not enough within industry variation over time for K/L. 19 IO tables for China are available for some other years but they are at 2-digit industry level. 20 We also compute upstreamness for industries excluding agricultural and mining industries, the most downstream industries are still service industries, and the most upstream industries tend to be involved in processing raw materials. Our empirical results are similar and are available upon request. 21 We constructed the crosswalks between the industry definitions in Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017) to our industries. The linear correlation between profit share and capital intensity and labour productivity and capital intensity is fairly weak. The correlation coefficient between capital intensity and profit share and capital intensity and labor productivity in the industry is 0.09 and 0.13, respectively. In contrast, the linear correlation between upstreamness and capital intensity is stronger, and the correlation coefficient is 0.35. To motivate our econometric specification in equation (16), we first plot the locally smoothed industry upstreamness and capital-labor ratio 22 In year 2002, one industry reports value-added from labor to be zero, and therefore K/L is missing for that industry. Therefore, there are only 110 observations in year 2002, and a total of 332 observations for K/L.
in Figure 7 . 23 The relationship between industry upstreamness and capital intensity is upward sloping, although upstreamness seems to peak when capital intensity is larger than 0.7.
Consistent with our theory, the relationship between profit share and capital-labor ratio is inverted U-shaped, as shown in Figure 8 . Lastly, Figure 9 shows that relationship between labour productivity (Q/L) and capital intensity is also inverted U-shaped. To our knowledge, the non-monotonicity of capital intensity on profit share and labour productivity has not been documented before and our theory offers to explain the reasoning behind the non-monotonicity.
In the following econometric exercises, we approximate the non-monotonicity using equation (16) and it is our goal to show that the non-monotonicity is robust to the inclusion of additional controls. 
Empirical Results
We estimate equation (16) where the dependent variable is upstreamness, defined in equation (15) and report the results in Table 2 . In columns (1) to (3), we estimate the effect of 23 We drop a few industries that are outliers in capital intensity and therefore limit to those industries with K/L<1. This accounts for roughly 95% of the industries in the data. In the regression analysis, we report the results for the full sample as well as the sample without outliers. K/L on upstreamness in each year separately, and in column (4), we report the results using all years. In all four columns, we find the capital intensity to have a positive but insignificant effect on the upstreamness of an industry. 24 However, these results may be driven by outliers. In columns (5) to (8), we provide the empirical results when we drop the outlier industries and limit the industries to K/L less than one, which account for 95% of the data. Capital intensity now has a positive and significant effect on upstreamness. This is consistent with findings in
Fally (2011) for US industries. This implies that when capital intensity is at the intermediate level, production that takes place also tends to be more midstream. Table 3 . Columns (1) to (4) report results using the full sample, and columns (5) to (8) report the results dropping the outlier industries. Columns (5) to (8) suggest there is a very strong non-monotonic relationship between capital intensity (K/L) and profit share. Using point estimates from column (8), profit share peaks when K/L is equal to 0.49. To further ensure that the relationship between profit share and K/Lis not linear, we also estimate equation (16) by omitting the K/L squared term, and the coefficient for K/L is no longer significant and very close to 0 for all columns.
25 Using point estimate form column (8) in Table 2 , when K/L is equal to 0.49, the upstreamness of the industry is between 2.98 and 3.59, between 2002 and 2012. The combination of the results from Tables 2 and 3 support our 24 If we include K/L squared term, both K/L and K/L squared are significant in columns (1) to (4), and the coefficient for K/L is positive, and the coefficient for K/L squared is negative. However, based on these estimates, this suggests that upstreamness peaks when K/L is equal to 1.82, which is two standard deviations above the mean in capital intensity. In fact, 99% of the industries have K/L <1.82. Therefore, our theory that when K/L is at the intermediate level, the industry is more midstream holds. These results are available upon request. 25 We also perform the robustness checks by omitting the K/L squared terms for labour productivity regression. Doing so makes the linear term insignificant and close to 0. These results are available upon request.
theory's prediction that production becomes more midstream for intermediate level of capital intensity due to higher profitability. Table 4 . Similar to the effect of K/L on profit share, the non-monotonic relationship exists between K/L and Q/L. Using the point estimates in column (8), output per labour peaks when K/L is equal to 0.61. We have established the basic non-monotonic relationship between K/L and profit share and K/L and labour productivity, and the linear relationship between K/L and upstreamness.
However, other factors that vary over industry and time may explain variations in the dependent variables. Using a control function approach, we control for time variant trade protection measures such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, FDI restrictions in Chinese industries, and time invariant U.S. industry characteristics such as assets, advertising and R&D expenditures, obtained from Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang(2017) . We estimate equation (17) and report the results in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) suggest that when capital intensity is at the intermediate level, production that takes place is more midstream. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that when capital intensity is at the intermediate level, profit share is higher. Although the squared terms in columns (5) and (6) are not significant at 10%, the point estimates are not significantly different from those in columns (8) in Table 4 , and based on the point estimates in column (6) Table 5, the labour productivity peaks when K/L is equal to 0.53, which is at the intermediate level of capital intensity. 
Conclusions
We establish a hierarchy assignment model and divide the supply chains into the 3 stages to investigate profit sharing along the supply chains. Our model reveals how operating within the comparative advantage consistent production stages in the chain could deliver both higher viability and labour productivity level for firms, which in turn generate higher profitability. 
